Fordham Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 6

Article 9

1981

Spielberg Reconsidered--Problems in Application and Content of
the Deferral Doctrine
John G. Culhane

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John G. Culhane, Spielberg Reconsidered--Problems in Application and Content of the Deferral Doctrine,
49 Fordham L. Rev. 1116 (1981).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss6/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

SPIELBERG RECONSIDERED-PROBLEMS
IN APPLICATION AND CONTENT OF THE
DEFERRAL DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION

Most collective bargaining agreements between union and employer provide for arbitration as the final step in the grievance
procedure.' Typically, an employee who believes that a dispute exists concerning the interpretation of his collective bargaining agreement will resort to this procedure 2 for disposition of the contractual
issue. 3 Based on the perception that the arbitral process promotes
"industrial peace and stability,' 4 the National Labor Relations Board'
(the Board) has a long-standing policy of declining to review arbitral
awards that involhe allegations of an unfair labor practice," as well as
a contractual issue.7
This policy was first articulated in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,' in
1. W. Baer, The Labor Arbitration Guide 6 (1974); R. Gorman, Basic Text in
Labor Law 541-42 (1976). The typical grievance arbitration mechanism provides for
several steps before arbitration. Id. at 542.
2. R. Gorman, supra note 1, at 541.
3. Id. at 543. See generally W. Baer, supra note 1, at 22-61, 92-61, 92-158; P.
Hays, Labor Arbitration: A Dissenting View 3-75 (1966); C. Updegraff & W. McCoy,
Arbitration of Labor Disputes (1946).
4. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926 (1962), enforced sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
The Board noted that the arbitral process is indispensable to the collective bargaining
relationship. Id. at 926 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)).
5. The National Labor Relations Board was established in § 3 of the Wagner Act
of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449. The present construction and operation of
the Board are set forth in §§ 3-5 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
153-155 (1976).
6. Unfair labor practices are listed in § 8 of the Act. National Labor Relations
Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Actions by an employer that constitute unfair labor
practices are set forth in § 8(a) of the Act. Id. § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
Those for which a union may be charged are listed in § 8(b) of the Act. Id. § 8(b), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). The deferral cases discussed in this Note invariably arise in
the § 8(a) context. The primary role of the Board in unfair labor practice cases Is
adjudicative; it neither prosecutes nor investigates these cases. For a concise discussion of the Board's role in both unfair labor practice and representation unit issues,
see NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting).
7. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), enforced sub
noam. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964);
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). The roots of the policy are
observable in two early Board cases. See Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B.
500, 501 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947);
Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced as amended, 141
F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944).
8. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). In Spielberg, the employer refused to reinstate
certain employees following a strike at the employer's plant. Id. at 1081. He based
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which the Board held that it would defer to arbitral awards provided
three criteria were satisfied. First, the arbitral proceedings must have
been fair and regular. Second, the parties must have agreed to be
bound. Third, the award must not have been clearly repugnant to the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act)." Subsequently, a fourth

his refusal upon the arbitrator's decision that discharge of these employees was warranted. Id. The Trial Examiner for the Board found that the discharged employees
had engaged in conduct protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The Board did not disagree with the Trial Examiner's findings,
expressing no opinion on the merits. Rather, it chose to "defer" to the award rendered by the arbitrator. Id. In the years immediately following, Spielberg met with
little criticism. Commentators generally seemed to accept the doctrine without engaging in thorough analysis. See Beatty, Arbitration of Unfair Labor Practice Disputes, 14 Arb. J. 180 (1959); Mathews, Critical Issues in Arbitration Practice:Seniority and Discharge Cases, 32 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 37 (1959); Note, The Effect Given
to an Arbitration Award by the NLRB in an Unfair Labor Practice Hearing, 20 La.
L. Rev. 767 (1960). But see Cummings, NLRB Jurisdiction and Labor Arbitration:
"Uniformity" v. "Industrial Peace," 12 Lab. L.J. 425 (1961) (arguing that arbitrators
should never hear disputes in which unfair labor practices are implicated). As the
parameters of the doctrine were defined, however, strident critics emerged. See
NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 384-97 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that deferral is both statutorily forbidden and unsound policy);
Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that Spielberg constitutes an impermissible abdication of the Board's statutory authority unless the arbitrator clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue and was competent to do so).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Banyard requirements in Stephenson v. NLRB, 550
F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977). See generally Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of
Misplaced Modesty, 49 Ind. L.J. 57 (1973) (arguing that arbitrators are not as competent as the Board in resolving most unfair labor practice issues).
9. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1080, 1082. Despite the broad deferral language employed
in Spielberg, subsequent cases have established that the Board considers deferral
inappropriate in § 8(a)(4) cases that involve threats of discharge or discrimination
against employees who avail themselves of the protection of the Act. Filmation
Assocs., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721 (1977). The Board also has held that deferral is
inappropriate in § 8(a)(2) cases in which an employer "'dominate[s] or interfere[s)
with the formation or administration of any labor organization." Servair, Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1278 (1978), enforcement denied, 607 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1979), withdrawn
and remanded, 624 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980). There has been dispute as to whether
there is authority for deferral. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976), provides that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement." Id. This section has consistently been relied upon to support
the Board's ability to fashion deferral doctrines. See, e.g., William E. Arnold Co. v.
Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974); NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell,
620 F.2d 367, 372-73, 378 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J., concurring); Bloom v. NLRB,
603 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Local Union No. 2188, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d
1087 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Dubo
Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963), enforced per curiam, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.
1965); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom.
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criterion became evident.'1 For deferral to be granted, the arbitrator
must have considered the statutory, unfair labor practice claim, in
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). Reliance upon this section, however, is misplaced. Section 203(d) is one of the sections
of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments that established the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service. It has been observed that "[t]his section simply means that
privately agreed upon settlement methods, including arbitration, are to be preferred
over mediation by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The section does
nothing to change the distribution of discretion and enforcement authority in
[section] . . . 8 ... of the Act." NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 390 n.9
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Indeed, even the pro-deferral majority in Collyer Insulated
Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), recognized that § 203(d) does not apply "specifically
to the Board." Id. at 840. Deferral advocates also have purported to find support
from the Supreme Court's enthusiastic endorsement of arbitration in the Steelworkers Trilogy cases: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 068
(1960) (even facially frivolous claims must be arbitrated, provided they are apparently
governed by the collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (mere ambiguity in arbitrator's
award is no reason to refuse to enforce an award, even when such ambiguity permits
an inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his or her authority); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960) (doubts as
to whether a dispute is covered by the contract should be resolved in favor of coverage). Taken together, these cases indicate a strong preference for the use of arbitration to resolve disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements. These cases,
however, were concerned with the relationship between the federal courts and arbitrators. The Supreme Court has subsequently noted that "[tihe relationship of the
Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different order." NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967). In addition, the Court has held that, when "the Board
disagree[s] with the arbiter, . . . the Board's ruling ... of course . . . take[s] precedence." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964). It has also
been argued that § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976),
precludes deferral. This section provides that the Board's power to remedy unfair
labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, lav, or otherwise." Id. § 160(a).
At least one Circuit Court Judge has stated that § 10(a), when coupled with two
express provisions of the Act that grant deferral authority, militates against a general
deferral policy. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 387-89 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). Although § 10(a) provides that the Board is not ousted from jurisdiction
simply because other means of resolving the dispute are available, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976), it does not preclude the Board from deferring. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 375 U.S. at 271; International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 925-26. Thus,
neither § 10(a) nor § 203(d) is dispositive. There nonetheless remains a tension between § 10(a) of the Act and the national policy favoring arbitration, as articulated in
the Steelworkers Trilogy. Despite this tension, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the Board's discretion in this area and has expressly approved the Spielberg doctrine.
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. at 270-72; Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198 n.6 (1962) (dictum). One opponent of deferral has seized
upon the fact that Carey concerned a jurisdictional dispute "as to which there are
separate statutory provisions." NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 394-95
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). There is not the slightest indication in Carey, however,
that the Supreme Court's approval of Spielberg was so narrowly confined. Id. at 383
(Garth, J., concurring).
10. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1113, 1114 Uan. 8, 1980).
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addition to the contractual issue." Because of this criterion, the employee may choose either to have the statutory issue presented to the
arbitrator, in which case deferral may ensue, or to withhold evidence
relevant to the unfair labor practice issue for presentation to the
Board. Hence, the employee is able to obtain two forums for resolution of a single factual issue. 2
Although these criteria seem unambiguous, there have been two
problems in the application of the deferral doctrine. First, there have
been divergent interpretations of the "clearly repugnant" criterion by
the Board and courts. In several cases, it has been recognized that
adherence to this criterion requires a narrow examination of arbitral
awards, and that deferral is mandated when the Board and the arbitrator merely disagree.' 3 In other cases, however, the strictures
placed upon Board examination by the "clearly repugnant" criterion
have been applied differently." Second, circuit courts have differed
11. Id., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1114. Suburban reestablished a requirement that
had existed prior to 1974. See, e.g., Trygon Elecs., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 404, 404 &
n.2 (1972); Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 928 (1972), overruled, Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974); Montgomery Ward &
Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 725, 725 n.1 (1972); Airco Indus. Gases-Pacific, Div. of Air
Reduction Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 677 (1972), overruled, Electronic Reproduction
Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974); John Klann Moving and Trucking Co., 170
N.L.R.B. 1207, 1207 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 833 (1969); Rotax Metals, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 72, 78 (1967); D.C. Int'l. Inc.,
162 N.L.R.B. 1383, 1384, enforcement denied on other grounds, 385 F.2d 215 (8th
Cir. 1967); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-87 (1963), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964). In 1974, the Board temporarily eliminated this requirement. Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758,
762 (1974), overruled, Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (Jan. 8, 1980). Dissatisfaction with the Electronic Reproduction rule, however, was apparent. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 541 (9th
Cir. 1977); Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1247,
1249 n.8 (Sept. 28, 1979); Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979); Max Factor and Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804
(1978), enforced, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2765 (9th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed,
49 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1981) (No. 80-1246); Automobile Transp., Inc., 223
N.L.R.B. 217, 217 & n.2 (1976). The Board, therefore, reinstated the requirement of
consideration of the statutory issue in the Suburban Motor Freight decision. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 113 (Jan. 8,
1980).
12. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1113, 1114 (Jan. 8, 1980); see UPS, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1484, 1485 n.3 (Sept. 30, 1980) (Board stated that it "would not defer to an
arbitration award where the litigants chose to reserve the unfair labor practice issue
for a different forum").
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 19S0M; Cook
Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1680 (Nov. 30,
1979); United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 192, 101 L.R.R.M. 1074 (May
3, 1979).
14. See, e.g., Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab.
Cas.) 12,467 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 1980); NLRB v. Max Factor and Co.. 105 L.R.R.M.
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as to the appropriate scope of review of Board deferral determinations.
Part I of this Note contends that the "clearly repugnant" criterion
mandates deferral when the arbitrator and the Board merely disagree, and that courts that have closely monitored decisions for compliance with Spielberg have properly reviewed Board refusals to
defer. 6 Part II of this Note proposes that the deferral doctrine be
revised, however, because proper application may lead to the sacrifice of employee rights protected under the Act.
I.

PROPER APPLICATION OF THE SPIELBERG DOCTRINE

A. The Clearly Repugnant Criterion
In the wake of the Spielberg decision, the Board did not closely
examine arbitral determinations. Consequently, a finding of "clear repugnancy" was unlikely.1 The rationale for this "hands off" approach
to deferral was articulated in International Harvester Co., ' in which
the Board, relying upon Supreme Court decisions praising

(BNA) 2765 (9th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan. 21,
1981) (No. 80-1246); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979);
Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1409 (Sept. 30,
1980); Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1443 (Sept. 29,
1980); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978).
15. Compare Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab.
Cas.) 1 12,467 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1981) and NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d
367 (3d Cir. 1980) and Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979)
with St. Luke's Mem'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980) and NLRB v.
Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1971) and Office and Professional Employees, Local 425, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
16. The Third Circuit holds that deferral is required when the award rendered
by the arbitrator may arguably be considered consistent with Board policy. NLRB v.
Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected this analysis. NLRB v. Max Factor and Co., 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2765, 2769 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S. Jan.
21, 1981) (No. 80-1246).
17. See, e.g., Disneyland, 157 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1966) (three-member panel upheld
Trial Examiner's reliance on Spielberg without dissecting the record); Raley's Inc.,
143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963) (extending deferral to representation questions); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962) (stating that arbitrator's award will be
sustained unless "palpably wrong"), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d
784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). 1. Oscherwitz & Sons, 130
N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961) (no dissection of arbitral record). But see Raytheon Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 883 (1963) (arbitral record examined to determine whether arbitrator considered the unfair labor practice charge), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326
F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
18. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
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arbitration,'" refused to examine the arbitrator's award closely o despite the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the union had violated the
Act. 2 ' After indicating that the "clearly repugnant" criterion left the
Board with little discretion to review arbitral awards,2 the Board held
that the criterion precluded the substitution of the Board's judgment
for that of the arbitrator.23
The Board's subsequent course, however, has been difficult to follow. It has frequently scrutinized arbitral awards by closely examining
the record prepared during arbitration.2
In man), cases involving

19. Id. at 926-27. The court also relied on § 203(d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976), which encourages voluntary settlement of
grievances. 138 N.L.R.B. at 926.
20. 138 N.L.R.B. at 934-36.
21. Id. at 927-29.
22. Id. at 927. This case represents perhaps the Board's most forceful proarbitration decision. The arbitrator found violations of § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) by the
company, and violations of § 8(b)(2) and § 8(b)(1)(A) by the union. Id. at 923. The
Trial Examiner rejected Spielberg deferral, finding that fundamental elements of fairness had not been satisfied. He stated that the employee "never agreed to be bound
by [the] award, had no notice of the hearings in that proceeding, and did not participate therein." Id. at 935. The Trial Examiner also found that the Board had a duty to
exercise its jurisdiction in this case and held that the award was contrary to the Act.
Id. at 934-35. The Board, by a 3-2 vote, disagreed. Id. at 924-25. After discussing
the merits of arbitration and coming close to holding that deferral might be required
under the Act, id. at 926-27, the Board stated that "it plainly appears to us that the
award is not palpably wrong. To require more of the Board would mean substituting
the Board's judgment for that of the arbitrator, thereby defeating the purposes of the
Act and the common goal of national labor policy of encouraging the final adjustment
of disputes ....
."Id. at 929. The Board's current Chairman, Fanning, dissented,
arguing that the Trial Examiner had been correct. Id. at 930 (Fanning, Member,
dissenting). A separate dissent was filed by Member Rodgers, who took issue with
the Board's "palpably wrong" approach. He stated that "the majority does not say
... the

award..

.

was ... consonant with rights secured to employees under the

National Labor Relations Act. The majority has avoided [this basic issue] and has
chosen to 'honor' the award solely because that 'award is not palpably wrong." Id. at
929-30 (Rodgers, Member, dissenting). international Harvester best indicated how
the Spielberg criteria were to be applied. It has been argued, however, that International Harvesterrepresents a departure from the Spielberg principles. See Meltzer,
Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in Proceedings of the

Twentieth Annual Meeting- National Academy of Arbitrators 1, 17 n.39 (1967);
Summers, Labor Arbitration: A PrivateProcess with a Public Function, 34 Rev. Jur.

U.P.R. 477, 493 (1965).
23. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928-29 (1962), enforced sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
24. See, e.g., B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1456 (Oct. 27, 1980) (arbitrator's conditioning reinstatement award on agreement not to engage in protected activity renders award repugnant to the Act); UPS,
Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1484 (Sept. 30, 1980) (merely
stating in the written grievance that employee was discharged for union activities is
not enough to satisfy requirement that arbitrator must have passed upon statutory
issue); Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1519 (Sept.
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employee discipline, for example, the Board has concluded, contrary
to the decision of the arbitrator, that the conduct was protected
under section 7 of the Act." Such determinations have routinely

30, 1980) (discharge not deferred to when arbitration record failed to disclose
whether information relating to the unfair labor practice was presented or decided
upon); Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1409
(Sept. 30, 1980) (arbitrator's award insupportable when remedy omitted backpay);
Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1443 (Sept. 29, 1980)
(discharge unlawful when predicated upon protected activity); Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1199 (May 23, 1980) (upholding
discharge as clearly repugnant to Act when arbitrator's findings found to be without
basis in fact); Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980) (taking issue with arbitrator's determination that employee was engaged in self-help rather than protected
activity); Sachs Elec. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 669 (1980) (no deferral when issue resolved
by arbitrator not factually parallel to statutory issue); General Warehouse Corp., 247
N.L.R.B. No. 142, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1294 (Feb. 14, 1980) (deferral to arbitrator's
award upholding discharge inappropriate when there is no indication that arbitrator
considered employee's protected activities); Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (Jan. 8, 1980) (deferral only appropriate
when arbitrator has resolved statutory issue); Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 245
N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979) (deferral inappropriate
when clarification provided by arbitrator, arguably written to secure deferral, failed
to cure statutory repugnancy); Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 101 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1608 (July 30, 1979) (award not sustained when arbitration panel composed of
members antagonistic to employees' interests and when employer engaged in activities "inherently destructive" of employees' rights); Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240
N.L.R.B. 1146 (1979) (no deferral when arbitrator erroneously separated the cause of
the suspension from the protected conduct); Ad Art, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No, 159, 99
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1626 (Sept. 29, 1978) (discharge not warranted for filing of grievances), enforced, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.) 9 12,467 (9th Cir.
Dec. 9, 1980); Gould, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1705 (Sept.
29, 1978) (conversion of discharge into suspensions does not cure statutory repugnancy
when employees were disciplined for engaging in ;nformational picketing and
sympathy strike), enforced, 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,343 (10th Cir. 1980); Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 588 (1978) (deferral inappropriate when duty to furnish information not resolved with reference to the Act); Owner's Maintenance
Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 100 (1977) (award upheld with respect to finding that discharges
were not for just cause, but overturned as to finding that employees were discharged
for other than union activities), enforced, 581 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
25. See, e.g., Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1443
(Sept. 29, 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980); Triple A Mach.
Shop, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979); Brown
Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1608 (July 30, 1979); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1979); Ad Art, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 99
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1626 (Sept. 29, 1978), enforced, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep, (CCH)
(90 Lab. Cas.) 1 12,467 (9th Cir. 1981); Gould, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 99
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1705 (Sept. 28, 1978), enforced, 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) T 12,343 (10th
Cir. 1980); Douglas Aircraft Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 578 (1978), enforcement denied, 609
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979); Owner's Maintenance Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 100 (1977).
Member Penello has criticized this type of procedure, stating that "Spielberg stands
for the principle that, absent specified abuses, the Board will ... defer to an arbitrator's decision. Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins . . . have not deferred but,
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been followed by a refusal to defer to arbitral decisions upholding
discipline or discharge as violative of the "clearly repugnant"
criterion.' In a number of cases, however, the Board has adhered to
its original "hands off" interpretation of the criterion and has deferred
to the arbitrator's award.'This inconsistency is traceable to differences among the Board's
membership as to the proper application of the "clearly repugnant"
criterion. Pursuant to section 3(b) of the Act,"2 the Board has frequently delegated its authority in a given case to a panel composed of
three of its five members. Differences between members as to the
proper application of the "clearly repugnant" criterion have produced
divergent results that vary with the composition of the panel. A host
of cases indicates that the Board's current Chairman, Fanning, and
Member Jenkins,- have been reluctant to defer, often finding arbitral
awards to be "clearly repugnant" to the Act.' Engaging in a resultinstead, after de novo review of the facts, have adopted that part of the award with
which they agree." Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867 n.3 (1978). Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part that "[e]mployees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities." National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
26. See note 25 supra. Once it is determined that an employee %as engaging in
protected activities under the Act, discipline of that employee violates § 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Hence, an arbitrator's decision to uphold such discipline yields a result "clearly
repugnant" to the Act.
27. See, e.g., Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 102 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1680 (Nov. 30, 1979); United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 192, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1074 (May 3, 1979); United Mine Workers, Local 1269, 241
N.L.R.B. No. 16, 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1496 (March 20, 1979); Kansas City Star Co.,
236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978); Lorain, Div. of Koehring Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1978);
Automobile Transp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 217 (1976).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
29. Chairman Fanning has been a Board member since 1957, while Member
Jenkins was appointed to the Board in 1963.
30. In several cases, Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins have concluded
that deferral was inappropriate, over the strong, sometimes strident, dissents of
Member Penello. See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1409 (Sept. 30, 1980); UPS, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 105
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1484 (Sept. 30, 1980); Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1443 (Sept. 29, 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No.
99, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1199 (May 23, 1980); General Warehouse Corp., 247
N.L.R.B. No. 142, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1294 (Feb. 14, 1980); Triple A Mach. Shop,
Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979); Ad Art, Inc.,
238 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1626 (Sept. 29, 1978), enforced, [198081] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.)
12,467 (9th Cir. 1980). When only
Chairman Fanning or Member Jenkins has been a member of such a panel, the
result more often has been to defer. See, e.g, American Bakeries Co., 249 N.L.R.B.
No. 170, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1305 (June 13, 1980); Pacific Southwest Airlines, 242
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oriented approach, they have been largely responsible for the tendency to restrict deferral to those cases in which they "happen to
agree" with the result reached in arbitration." As a practical matter,
when Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins have represented the
controlling voice in a deferral case, deferral generally has been
granted only when the arbitrator has ruled in favor of the
employee.3 2 When the employee has unsuccessfully arbitrated, Fanning and Jenkins have frequently declared the award "clearly
repugnant." '
In contrast, Member Penello4 has been reluctant to
find awards "clearly repugnant" to the Act, and has argued for deferral in cases in which the Board and the arbitrator have "merely
disagreed."-3
N.L.R.B. No. 151, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1366 (June 18, 1979); Automobile Transp.,
Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 217 (1976). But see Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No.
104, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1680 (Nov. 30, 1979).
31. Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867 n.3 (1978). Member Penello has
stridently criticized his colleagues for emasculating the doctrine. The criticism, at
times, borders on outrage. See Texaco, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 375, 379 (1977) (Penello,
Member, dissenting) (characterizing the case as post-arbitral and terming his colleagues' refusal to defer "incredible").
32. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1680
(Nov. 30, 1979); Lorain, Div. of Koehring Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 1060 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1409 (Sept. 30, 1980); UPS, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1484 (Sept. 30, 1980); Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1443 (Sept. 29, 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 104 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1199 (May 23, 19.80); General Warehouse Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 103
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1294 (Feb. 14, 1980); Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No.
24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979); Ad Art, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 159,
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1626 (Sept. 29, 1978), enforced, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
(90 Lab. Cas.) 1 12,467 (9th Cir. 1980).
34. Member Penello was appointed to the Board in 1972 and continues to serve.
35. See, e.g., Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1409 (Sept. 30, 1980) (Penello, Member, dissenting); Albertsons, Inc., 252
N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1443 (Sept. 29, 1980) (Penello, Member,
dissenting); American Bakeries, 249 N.L.R.B. No. 170, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1305
(June 13, 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1199 (May 23, 1980) (Penello, Member, dissenting); Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246
N.L.R.B. No. 104, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1680 (Nov. 30, 1979); Atlantic Steel Co.,
245 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1247 (Sept. 28, 1979); Triple A Mach.
Shop, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979) (Penello, Member, dissenting); Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1608 (July 30, 1979) (Penello, Murphy, Members, dissenting); United States Postal
Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 192, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1074 (May 3, 1979); Ad Art,
Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1705 (Sept. 29, 1978) (Penello,
Member, dissenting), enforced, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.)
12,467 (9th Cir. 1980); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978). Interestingly,
Member Penello, who purports to adhere to Spielberg strictly, has added a "wrinkle"
to the doctrine. He would not defer when the rationale of the arbitrator is clearly
repugnant to the Act. Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1190 (1980) (Penello,
Member, dissenting).
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Similarly, the courts that have considered the issue have disagreed
as to the proper definition of the "clearly repugnant" criterion." The
Third Circuit most clearly expressed its position concerning the
Board's obligation to defer to the arbitral process under the "clearly
repugnant" criterion in NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-MAaxwell. " In this section 8(a)(1) case, the arbitrator had upheld the discharge of an
employee." The Board refused to defer to the arbitrator's judgment,
stating that the employee's conduct had not been sufficiently opprobrious to remove it from the protection of section 7.Y It held that
the discharge thus violated section 8(a)(1) and that the arbitrator's decision was "clearly repugnant" to the Act."0 On appeal, the Third
Circuit held that, when the decision of an arbitrator "may arguably
be characterized as not inconsistent with Board policy," the Board
may not refuse to defer." Because the court concluded that it was
reasonable to characterize the employee's activities as arguably unprotected,4 it refused to enforce the Board's order.41 Therefore, if the
36. Compare NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) with
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 371.
39. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 237 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1065 (1978), enforcement denied,
620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 1063.
41. 620 F.2d at 374 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. The court held the conduct "arguably unprotected" for several reasons.

First, it held that, based upon the record compiled at arbitration, employee Richardson's statements were arguably deliberate falsehoods. Deliberate falsehoods are unprotected under the Act. Id. at 375-76 (citing Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383
U.S. 53, 61 (1966)). Second, based again upon the arbitrator's record, the conduct
could also be deemed "unprotected disloyalty." Such conduct would justify the employee's discharge. Id. at 376 (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Uefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953)). Third, because the arbitrator concluded
that the employee's activities were "intended to interfere with the Company's longestablished collective bargaining relationship with the Union," it was deemed arguable that the conduct was unprotected. Id. at 376-77 (footnote omitted). Finally, the
court held that the arbitral record raised the possibility that the employee's conduct
was not concerted, and was, therefore, unprotected. In reaching this determination,
the court relied upon precedent within the circuit. Id. at 377. The court emphasized
that, although Spielberg had been satisfied, no opinion was being expressed as to
how the case would be decided in "a trial de noco." Id. at 377.
43. Id. at 370. The Tenth Circuit has agreed with the holding in Pincus, but has
thus far not found the Board to have acted improperly in refusing to defer. NLRB v.
Gould, Inc., 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2788 (10th Cir. 1980) (employee's conduct not
even arguably unprotected); NLRB v. Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669,
673-76 (10th Cir. 1980) (Board did not abuse discretion in refusing to defer to arbitral
proceedings). In NLRB v. Auburn Rubber Co., 384 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1967), the
court became the first to refuse to enforce a Board order when the Board had refused to defer under Spielberg. Id. at 3. The case, however, is inapposite because
the unfair labor practice issue "was raised before the Board by an unaffected third
party." NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d at 397 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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arbitrator's award is neither in plain defiance of the Act nor wholly at
odds with the interpretation given the Act by the Board and the
courts, the award is not clearly repugnant and deferral will be
mandated."
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has demonstrated two
approaches to deferral. In some cases, it has explicitly rejected the
"arguably unprotected" analysis and has upheld Board decisions not
to defer when the arbitrator's award was only arguably inconsistent
with Board policy. " Another application of the "clearly repugnant"
criterion was expressed in Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 6 in which
the court refused to enforce the Board's decision not to defer because
the reasons for the arbitrator's award were susceptible to two
interpretations-one statutorily repugnant, and one permissible."7 In
effect, the Ninth Circuit held that because the reasons for the award
were unclear, the arbitrator's decision was not "clearly repugnant" to
the Act."
An analysis of Spielberg and its progeny reveals that the interpretation given the "clearly repugnant" criterion by Member Penello and
49 which repby the Third Circuit is correct. InternationalHarvester,
resents the Board's clearest expression of the deferral doctrine, mandates deferral in cases of mere disagreement, even when the award
would have been at variance with the Board's determination had the
agency considered the case de novo .? Member Penello has recognized that refusal to defer may properly occur only when the arbitral
award is "wholly at odds with Board law."'" Similarly, the Third
44. 620 F.2d at 373-75.
45. Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.)
12,467, at 26,283-85 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Max Factor and Co., 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2765, 2769 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S,L.W. 3560
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1981) (No. 80-1246).
46. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
47. Id. at 354. The court seized upon the "palpably wrong" language of International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 929 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964), in arriving at this
determination. 609 F.2d at 354-55. The court also relied upon United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), for the proposition that a
"'mere ambiguity" in the arbitrator's opinion does not justify refusal to defer. 609
F.2d at 598. The reliance was misplaced. Although the Steelworkers Trilogy concerns
the relationship between federal courts and arbitration, "[t]he relationship of the
Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different order." NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
48. 609 F.2d at 354.
49. 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
50. Id. at 929.
51. Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1409
(Sept. 30, 1980). At a minimum, "clear repugnancy to the Act" must include an
award "contrary to Board law." Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1149
(1979) (Truesdale, Member, concurring).
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Circuit's approach in Pincus Brothers follows the interpretation of the
"'clearly repugnant" criterion set forth in International Harvester.
Although the Board has never explicitly articulated an "arguably inconsistent" test, such a standard is implicit in International
Harvester52 and in those cases in which the Board has undertaken a
merely cursory review of arbitral determinations.'
Deferral may
only be refused if the award is not even arguably consistent with
Board policy because only in such a case is the award "clearly repugnant to the Act." '
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's approaches are unpersuasive. First,
rejection of the arguably inconsistent standard does not comport with
International Harvester.' Second, the Board has never indicated
that deferral is mandated when an ambiguous award has been rendered by the arbitrator.' Rather, in such a case, clarification of the
award is necessary to enable the Board to determine whether the
award is, in fact, "wholly at odds with Board law," and therefore,
"clearly repugnant" to the Act. '
The approach taken by Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins
also fails to consider the Board's interpretation of the "clearly repugnant" criterion and effectively substitutes an analysis under which the
criterion is employed only when expedient.'
Although the Board
52. See International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928-29 (1962). enforced
sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003
(1964).
53. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
54. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
55. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
57. Clarification renders the basis for the decision discernible. Thereafter, the
Board can properly monitor the award for statutory repugnancy.
58. See, e.g., Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1519 (Sept. 30, 1980); Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1409 (Sept. 30, 1980); Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1443 (Sept. 30, 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 104
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1199 (May 23, 1980); Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B.
No. 51, 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1134 (May 14, 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980); General Warehouse Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 103
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1294 (Feb. 14, 1980); Suburban Motor Freight. Inc., 247 N.L.R.B.
No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (Jan. 8, 1980); Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 245
N.L.R.B. No. 24, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (Sept. 21, 1979); Brown Co., 243
N.L.R.B. No. 100, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1608 (July 30, 1979); Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1366 (June 14, 1979) (Fanning, Member, dissenting); United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 192, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1074 (May 3, 1979) (Fanning, Jenkins, Members, dissenting); SeaLand Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1979); Ad Art, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 159, 99
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1626 (Sept. 29, 1978), enforced, [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
(90 Lab. Cas.)
12,467 (9th Cir. 1980); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866
(1978) (Fanning, Jenkins, Members, dissenting); Retail Clerks, Local 324, 235
N.L.R.B. 711 (1978); Montgomery Ward, 234 N.L.R.B. 588 (1978). Douglas Aircraft.
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may alter the Spielberg doctrine, such a change must be expressly
made.39 The Board, as any other administrative agency, is not empowered to depart from its own articulated standards on an arbitrary
basis.6" Further, the approach of Chairman Fanning and Member
Jenkins has the unacceptable effect of leaving litigants in a state of
confusion because it is not possible to know whether Spielberg will
be strictly employed, in which case the review is narrowly
circumscribed,"' or whether the doctrine will effectively be ignored to
enable the Board to reach the merits of the case."2 The result hinges
on the composition of the panel, a factor that should not be relevant.
B. The Appropriate Standard of Review
Several approaches to the review of Board refusals to defer are
evident. The Second,' Seventh,' and D.C. ' Circuits have given the
Board a relatively free hand in applying the deferral doctrine. They

234 N.L.R.B. 578 (1978), enforcement denied, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979); Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974), overruled, Suburban
Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (Jan. 8, 1980);
Terminal Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 672 (1970) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
59. This duty to adhere to precedent absent explicit change is imposed upon
administrative agencies. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 808 (1973); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653-54
(1954); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862,
872 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
International Union (UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
60. In recognizing the injustice of such departures, courts have overturned
agency determinations when unexplained departure from precedent has occurred.
E.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805-06 (1973);
Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653 (1954); Local 777,
Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 881-82 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Teamsters
Local 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1976); International Union
(UAW) v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mary Carter Paint Co. v.
FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 46 (1965);
Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224-25 (D.C. Cir.
1959); see Petition for Certiorari at 10-15, Max Factor and Co. v. NLRB, No. 801246 (U.S., filed Jan. 21, 1981). See generally W. Gellhorn, C. Byse, P. Strauss,
Administrative Law 393-95 (7th ed. 1979); Byse, Requirement of Findings and
Reasons in Formal Proceedings in Administrative Law, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 393
(1978 Supp.).
61. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
63. NLRB v. Horn 6c Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1971).
64. St. Luke's Mem'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980); Dreis &
Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976).
65. Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Office & Professional Employees, Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

1981]

SPIELBERG RECONSIDERED

1129

have engaged in merely cursory examinations of decisions involving
application of Spielberg. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has indicated that the Board is entitled to determine the extent to which it
wishes to defer, absent a showing that no discernible pattern is being
followed. 6 Thus, in cases in which the Board and the arbitrator have
disagreed, the Board's decisions not to defer have been upheld. "
Conversely, the Third and Ninth Circuits have held the Board to a
stricter standard of review. Although both circuits purportedly have
applied an "abuse of discretion" standard,' in practice, it has been
one of legal error.,
Board decisions not to defer have been closely
66. The courts have used equivocal, unhelpful language. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971) C'[The Board] can change its
mind or alter its standards for deference in some respects without necessarily engaging in conduct so blameworthy as to justify our calling it abuse of discretion."); Office
and Professional Employees, Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(The Board's order will be enforced absent a showing of "sailing without any rudder,
or . . . charting a course too far out to sea."). The Third Circuit formerly held that
deferral was voluntary, Radio Television Tech. School, Inc. v.NLRB, 488 F.2d 457
(3d Cir. 1973), but no longer adheres to this position. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d. Cir. 1980). The First Circuit's position is difficult to
gauge. NLRB v. Davol, Inc., 597 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1979), arose in the pre-arbitral
context, but there is strong language in the case that suggests that deferral, in the
broad sense, is never mandated. Id. at 786 ("[W]here the issue is one of statutory
construction and not of contractual interpretation, there is no need for deferral.").
NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
962 (1980), however, carries a contrary implication. Citing Spielberg, the court held
that the Board had committed reversible error in ignoring the factual findings of the
arbitrator. Id. at 721-23. Although this case has been read as requiring compliance
with Spielberg, Miller, The Board at the Turn of the Decade, VIII Labor Arbitration
Index 73, 74 (1980), the court, in Wilson Freight, did not expressly address the issue
whether deferral would be compelled if the Board properly considered the factual
findings of the arbitrator. Finally, the Sixth Circuit, in John Klann Moving and
Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969),
appears to have given the Board wide latitude concerning deferral. id. at 263.
67. Office and Professional Employees, Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 320
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
68. St. Luke's Mem'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1980);
Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Horn & Hardart
Co., 439 F.2d 674, 678-81 (2d Cir. 1971); Office and Professional Employees. Local
425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
69. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1980); Douglas
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354-55 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 380 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J.,
concurring). Spielberg, by its very language, indicates that the Board %illdefer when
the three criteria have been met. Whether an award is "clearly repugnant" to the
Act is a question of law. Id. The Board thus discerns the legal basis for the arbitrator's award and then decides whether that basis is "clearly repugnant" to the relevant
labor law. Id. Because the Board is deciding a matter of law, "the appropriate
standard of review must necessarily be that of legal error." Id. Under this analysis,
the reviewing court must decide whether the Board's determination regarding statutory repugnancy is correct. If not, the Board's order may not be enforced. Id. at
380-81.
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monitored for compliance with the "clearly repugnant" criterion.
These courts have stated that, absent a finding of such compliance,
Board determinations that deferral is inappropriate should be
reversed.7,

Underlying the analyses of the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits
may be the belief that the Board, as the body responsible for the
interpretation and implementation of the Act, is best able to interpret
and apply its own doctrines.72 Given the perception of administrative
agencies as uniquely qualified to resolve issues within their
jurisdiction,'" this argument has some plausibility. The Board, however, as any administrative agency, should be bound by its own strictures until it expressly overrules the case creating those strictures. 74
Having determined that national labor policy would best be served
by deferring to arbitration in certain circumstances, the Board should
not be permitted to ignore its own doctrine. The Third and Ninth
Circuits have properly recognized that Spielberg and its progeny have
placed severe limitations upon the Board's discretion in the deferral
context.75 In fact, the Spielberg criteria divest the Board of

71. Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB [1980-81] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (90 Lab. Cas.)
12,467, at 26,283 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Max Factor and Co., 105 L.R,R.M.
(BNA) 2765, 2767 (9th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3560 (U.S.
Jan. 21, 1981) (No. 80-1246); NLRB v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425, 428 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80-814); NLRB
v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1980); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
NLRB, 587 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978).
72. NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971); Office and
Professional Employees, Local 425 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 314, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 809 (1973) (ICC may
select method that, in its judgment, will best effectuate congressional intent); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1950) (when statute provided certain factors for Secretary of Agriculture to consider in allocating
sugar import quotas, it was not necessary that he apply those factors mechanically);
International Detective Serv., Inc., v. ICC, 613 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(statutory requirement that ICC consider five factors permits discretion as to weight
to be accorded each).
73. There has been a perception that the complexity of society and the attendant
need for administrative agencies imply a recognition that these agencies require a
large degree of discretion in carrying out statutory mandates. The Fifth Circuit has
observed that "[o]ur complex society now demands administrative agencies. The variety of problems dealt with make absolute consistency, perfect symmetry, impossible.
And the law reflects its good sense by not exacting it." Mary Carter Paint Co. v.
FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring), rev'd on other

grounds, 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
74. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808
(1973); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1954); Local
777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
75. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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discretion. 6 Significantly, these courts have not held that Spielberg
could not be expressly disavowed.- " Rather, they' have demanded
only that the Board adhere to its own doctrine in the absence of an
announced departure from precedent.This approach comports with basic requirements of fairness.' Litigants have a right to be apprised of the Board's disposition of a
prospective deferral case.' Current Board flux on this issue requires
litigants to engage in educated guesswork.' Proper adherence to the
76. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Ma'xwell, 620 F.2d 367, 381 (3d. Cir. 1980) (Garth, J.,
concurring) ("The Spielberg doctrine . . . does not confer discretion on the Board.
Rather, it requires the Board to determine whether each of the three parts of the
Spielberg test is satisfied."); see NLRB v. Campbell Prod. Dep't, 623 F.2d 876, 881
(3d Cir. 1980) (NLRB must adhere to its own five-day objection rule in representation elections); K. Davis, Administrative Law Text §§ 4.03, 4.04 (1972) (banking
agency's gradual narrowing of discretion favorably reviewed as comporting with
general desirability of reduction of agency discretion); cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363, 380 (1957) (Secretary of State could, and did, create regulations that restricted
his discretion); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-67 (1954) (Attorney
General's delegation of authority to Board of Immigration Appeals constituted a restriction on discretion that could not be sidestepped).
77. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 382 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J.,
concurring) ("Since the Board has original discretion to select among various deference standards, it unquestionably has discretion to change . . . its own standard.");
see Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd., v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). Administrative agencies are generally empowered to
disavow prior doctrines and holdings. Proper judicial review, however, is not possible absent a discernible basis for such disavowal. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita
Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 805-06 (1973); International Union, UA\\ v. NLRB, 459
F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied., 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see Local 777,
Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862. 882 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 364 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
It is not generally required, however, that the agency furnish detailed reasons for its
holding. O-J Trans. Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976); Office and Professional Employees, Local 425 v. NLRB,
419 F.2d 314, 319-20 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
78. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
79. The "law does not permit an agency to grant to one person the right to do
that which it denies to another similarly situated. There may not be a rule for Monday, [and] another for Tuesday ....
Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC. 333 F.2d 654,
660 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 46
(1965); see Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69
(1962); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862,
872 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1967); Burinskas v. NLRB, 357
F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
80. See Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d
862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The court stated that the decision should not turn on "the
composition of the NLRB panel which happens to hear the case." Id. (footnote omitted).
81. Such a result is unfair to litigants, see note 79 supra, and is at odds with the
requirement of administrative law that an agency provide a reasoned basis for dci-
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doctrine, however, leads to an unjust result because the deferral doctrine itself is flawed.
II.

PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE SPIELBERG

DOcTIUNE

A. The Deficiencies of the Spielberg Doctrine
The difficulties involved in application of the "clearly repugnant"
criterion are compounded by a problem in the content of that
criterion.82 When the criterion is strictly construed, the Board has
rarely found arbitral decisions that are "clearly repugnant" to the
Act. 83 In close cases, there has been disagreement among Board
members,81 and between the Board and reviewing courts, " " as to
when employee conduct "crosses the line" from protected to unprotected activity. A host of factors must be weighed and considered.4 ')
Yet, Spielberg mandates deferral when reasonable disagreement
exists.
sion-making. "[I]f an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without
discussion it may cross the line from . . . tolerably terse to . . . intolerably mute."
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See also Secretary of Agriculture v.
United States, 347 U.S. 645, 653 (1954); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,
416 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82. The contrast between the Third and Ninth Circuits regarding this criterion
graphically illustrates the problems encountered by reviewing courts in attempting to
decipher "clearly repugnant." See notes 37-48 supra.
83. See notes 17-23, 27 supra and accompanying text. Even assuming rigid
adherence to the doctrine, however, there will be decisions by arbitrators that even
Member Penello deems "clearly repugnant" to the Act. See, e.g., B & L Motor
Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1456 (Oct. 27, 1980);
Retail Clerks, Local 324, 235 N.L.R.B. 711 (1978); Montgomery Ward & Co., 234
N.L.R.B. 588 (1978).
84. In other words, assuming agreement on the deferral issue, Board members
may reasonably disagree at to whether the employee's conduct was protected under
§ 7 of the Act. In Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980), for example, the
majority held that the employee had engaged in concerted, protected activities under
§ 7, and thus refused to defer to the arbitrator's holding that the discharge had been
proper. Id. at 1188. In dissent, Member Penello conceded that deferral was inappropriate, inasmuch as the arbitrator's rationale was "clearly repugnant" to the Act.
Id. at 1190. He nonetheless concluded that the conduct had not constituted concerted, protected activity. Id. at 1191. See also Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B.
1146 (1979).
85. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co, v.
NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.
1980) (dictum); NLRB v. Auburn Rubber Co., 384 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1967).
86. Section 7 establishes the right "to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1976). Because this language is imprecise, the most fruitful approach is to consult
cases in which the Board has held that § 7 rights were infringed. See B. Feldacker,
Labor Guide to Labor Law 98-102 (1980); M. Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law
§ 404 (2d ed. 1965).
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The significance of this latter point becomes apparent when the
respective roles of the Board and the arbitrator are considered. The
arbitrator is best described as a contract reader." Although resort to
external law may be inevitable,"5 the arbitrator generally renders a
decision through the process of parsing contractual language.' Many
arbitrators are quite skilled and experienced at this task.- Moreover,
to the extent that an arbitrator looks beyond the express language of
the contract, the general purpose is to promote harmonious relations
within the plant 9 -to establish what has been referred to as a "common law of the shop." " Resolution of statutory issues may occur
incidentally and incorrectly.94
The function of the Board is different. Operating pursuant to congressional authority, the Board is charged with the vindication of
statutory guarantees embodied in the Act." These rights, however,

87. Bloch, Labor Arbitration's Crossroads Revisited: The Role of the Arbitrator
and the Response of the Courts, 47 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 363, 364-66 (1978). St.

Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and its Progeny, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (1977).
88. Generally, resort to external law should only be made when necessary to
determine "'the sense of the agreement,"' Bloch, supra note 87, at 365, or when the
parties contractually provide that an arbitrator shall draw upon statutory or decisional
law, as when "a contract clause . . . plainly tracks certain statutory language." St.
Antoine, supra note 87, at 1143. In the latter case, the arbitrator is not, technically,
purporting to implement the statute; rather, he is attempting to effectuate the parties' agreement that they be bound by his reading of the statute. Id. But see Feller,
The Coming End of Arbitration'sGolden Age, in Bureau of National Affairs, Arbitration 97 (1976) (arbitrators do not so much interpret the collective bargaining agreement as apply rules governing the employer-union relationship). For a thorough discussion of the various positions taken on this subject, see Teple, Deferral to Arbitra-

tion: Implications of NLRB Policy, 29 Arb. J. 65 (1974).
89. St. Antoine, supra note 87, at 1142.
90. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 580-81 (1960); P. Hays, supra note 3, at 37-75; Covington, Arbitratorsand the
Board: A Revised Relationship, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 91, 106-110 (1978); Cetman, supra
note 8, at 61; McCulloch, The Arbitration Issue in NLRB Decisions, 19 Arb. J. 134,

136 (1964); Rothschild, Arbitration and National Labor Relations Board: An Examination of Preferences and Prejudices and Their Relevance, 28 Ohio St. L.J. 195,
259 (1967); Teple, supra note 88, at 74-78; Zimmer, Wired For Collyer: Rationalizing
NLRB and Arbitration Jurisdiction, 48 Ind. L.J. 141, 145 (1973).
91. See generally Feller, supra note 88, at 104.
92. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
93. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) (the arbitrator may look "to 'the law' for help in determining the sense of the
agreement").
94. See Getman, supra note 8, at 73.
95. National Labor Relations Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
96. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941) *'The Board ...
does not exist for the 'adjudication of private rights'; it 'acts in a public capacity to
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may not coincide with those provided for in a particular collective
bargaining agreement.Y The "clearly repugnant" criterion, therefore,
is undesirable because, when properly applied, 91 it prevents the
Board from fully protecting the litigants' statutory rights. Once it is
determined that the award rendered by the arbitrator is not "clearly
repugnant,"" and that the arbitrator has "passed on" the statutory
issue-something the arbitrator may be ill-equipped to do '00-the
inquiry must end. Terminating the review at this juncture allows the
arbitrator to become responsible for the protection of statutory
rights.'"' The arbitrator, however, it not likely to be skilled in such

give effect to the declared public policy of the Act to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by encouraging collective bargaining."' (quoting National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940)). Not only does the Board enjoy a
congressional grant of power, see note 95 supra, but it has also been made statutorily
accountable to Congress for the exercise of that power. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(c) (1976)
(Board must report to the President and to Congress annually).
97. For example, the contractual interpretation of "discharge for just cause" may
turn out to be quite different from the Board's conclusion as to whether the discharge was proper under the Act. Covington, supra note 90, at 117-22. In such a
case, deferral may be equivalent to deprivation of statutory rights. Thus, the charging party will have been "deprived of rights guaranteed by public law as a result of
an act of the agency charged with protecting those rights. This is clearly not to be
countenanced." Id. at 118.
98. See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
99. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928 (1962), enforced sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
100. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text. A lack of confidence in the
arbitrator's competence in non-contract related decisions prompted the court In
Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974), to modify Spielberg to prevent
deferral when the arbitrator had exceeded his competence. Id. at 347-49; see Covington, supra note 90, at 97.
101. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme
Court held that statutory rights exist independently oF private rights adjudicated by
an arbitrator, and that the factual coincidence of the rights is not dispositive. Id. at
50. The Court also indicated that an arbitrator exceeds his authority when the award
transcends the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 53. Gardner-Denver arose in
the context of a suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(e)-2000(e)-17 (1976). Commentators have argued that both the legislative
history surrounding Title VII and the high priority given issues of discrimination
make the statutory-contractual distinction inapplicable to the unfair labor practicebreach of contract controversy. Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver: Some Preliminary Observations, 25 Lab. L.J. 259 (1974); Note,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 Hastings L.J.
403 (1975). The Supreme Court, however, expressly discussed the relationship between arbitrators and the Board in Gardner-Denver, stating that "consideration of
the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual dispute under the collective-bargaining
agreement does not preclude subsequent consideration of the claim by the National
Labor Relations Board as an unfair labor practice charge." 415 U.S. at 50. This does
not indicate that the Board may not, in the exercise of its discretion, defer to an
arbitral award. The opinion does, however, indicate the Court's recognition of the
divergence between contractual and statutory rights. It is noteworthy that at least
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matters,1 0 nor has he been charged with the resolution of unfair labor
practice disputes."3 To permit arbitral resolution of statutory issues
is to sacrifice express statutory rights on the "altar of institutionalism."

-o

The Board, therefore, must rationally expand its jurisdiction over
arbitration awards that involve unfair labor practices to guarantee justice to all parties. The Board should not be constrained from examining all relevant evidence in making the determination." The following proposal, designed to revise the Spielberg doctrine, reflects these
considerations.
B. A Suggested Approach
The Board should, consistent with its statutory role as the sole
source of remedy for unfair labor practices,'" defer to an award resulting from a completed arbitral proceeding" if it determines that
the award has adequately protected the statutory rights of the party
seeking the Board's assistance.'" Deferral should not be granted absent a written opinion " in which the arbitrator fully addresses those

one Board member elaborated upon this distinction between contractual and statutory rights, and argued that Congress "did not intend to authorize the Board to
subdelegate [the task of adjudicating unfair labor practice disputes] by recognizing
any private arrangement or agreement of the parties, including arbitration." 1.
Oscherwitz & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078, 1083-84 (1961) (Kimball, Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102. See notes 88-92 supra and accompanying text.
103. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(c), 160(e), (f) (1976).
104. Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 897, 909 n.32
(1975).
105. For example, because transcripts are not always kept in arbitral proceedings,
the existence of such a transcript in the hands of one of the parties may provide
some indication as to what occurred. See United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B.
No. 192, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1074, 1076 (May 3. 1979) (Fanning, Chairman. Jenkins, Member, dissenting). Professor Covington has stated that Board scrutiny of
arbitral proceedings is desirable. Covington, supra note 90, at 127.
106. The Board should recognize that arbitrators are vindicating a separate set of
rights, namely, those outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. See note 89
supra and accompanying text.
107. In contrast, the Board should not defer in those cases in which one party has
preferred the processes of the Board over arbitration. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), is the source of this pre-arbitral deferral doctrine. The Collyer
doctrine has been limited, however, by General Am. Transp. Corp.. 228 N.L.R.B.
808 (1977), and its continuing vitality is in some doubt. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 393 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
108. See notes 95-104 supra and accompanying text.
109. A written opinion will save the Board the time and effort of attempting to
discern the basis of the award. See Covington. supra note 90. at 125.
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issues subject to the jurisdiction of the Board."' In determining
whether deferral is appropriate in a given case, the Board should
consider the extent to which the dispute concerns the terms and
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement,' the extent to which
the union's interests during arbitration were harmonious with those of
the employee,"' and the composition of the arbitral panel."'
This proposal has the virtue of allowing a degree of discretion to
The rigid Spielberg checklist is replaced
remain with the Board."

110. Not every breach of a collective bargaining agreement is also an unfair labor
practice. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 391 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
111. Potential unfair labor practices that may be resolved by discerning the meaning of the contract are the best cases for deferral. If the arbitrator determines that
the action taken by an employer did not violate the terms of the contract, the predicate for a § 8(a)(5) violation vanishes. NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367,
391 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See also General American Transp.
Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810-11 (1977) (Murphy, Chairwoman, concurring). In addition, the Board may be more likely to defer in § 8(a)(5) cases than in a typical
§ 8(a)(3) case because the former, which involve the meaning of a contract, generally
involve the kinds of situations with which arbitrators routinely deal. See Covington,
supra note 90, at 108. For example, decisions concerning the meaning of a subcontracting clause have been deemed to be within the competence of arbitrators. United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
112. This factor has been of dispositive significance in several recent Board cases.
See UPS, Inc., 252 NLRB No. 145, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1484 (Sept. 30, 1980)
(deferral inappropriate when union may have been in conflict with interests of employee); Brown Co., 243 NLRB No. 100, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1608 (July 30, 1979)
(Spielberg deferral not granted when committee upholding work transfer consisted of
members whose interests were in conflict with those of the charging party); Mason
and Dixon Lines, Inc., 237 NLRB 6, 6 (1978) (Board approved Administrative Law
Judge's determination that union's representation of employee had been perfunctory
at best, and that, therefore, the Spielberg "fair and regular" criterion had not been
met).
113. Member Jenkins has maintained that deferral is inappropriate absent a "neutral" member on the arbitral panel. Automobile Transp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 217
(1976) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part); Terminal Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B.
672 (1970). This factor may be relevant when there is, for example, an arbitral panel
adverse to an employee's interests. See, e.g., Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1608 (July 30, 1979). Consideration may also be given to the competence of the arbitrator here. See Covington, supra note 90, at 106-10.
114. It is instructive to compare the Spielberg doctrine with the Board's deferral
stance in the pre-arbitral context. Although the Board first announced a pre-arbitral
deferral policy in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), it was not until a
year later, in National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972), overruled, General Am.
Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), that the Board announced the extension of
the doctrine to § 8(a)(3) cases. In National Radio, a majority of the Board determined
that the arbitral process would be deferred to, provided that the contract and Its
interpretation were central to the dispute, id. at 532, and that it could reasonably he
anticipated that the dispute would be resolved in a manner not inconsistent with the
Act. Id. at 531. This standard, which involves questions of fact, leaves the Board
with a degree of discretion. Collyer and National Radio, taken together, indicate that
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with a standard that focuses on the relevant circumstances.'
At the
same time, the proposal recognizes that arbitrators can, and often do,
settle contractual issues in a way that simultaneously satisfies the
Board that the factually related unfair labor practice issue has been
resolved in the arbitration proceedings. " ' In addition, reviewing
courts are notified that the Board has justifiably elected to retain a
large amount of discretion in the deferral area." No longer may the
when the Board reserves a measure of discretion, reviewing courts will rarely overturn the agency's deferral determinations. NLRB v. Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co.,
631 F.2d 669, 673-79 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 622 F.2d 425,
428 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1981) (No. 80814); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir.
1979); NLRB v. Davol, Inc., 597 F.2d 782, 787 (1st Cir. 1979); Lodges 700, 743,
International Ass'n of Machinists Workers v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir.
1975); Local Union No. 2188, IBEW v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974); Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1024,
1027 (1st Cir. 1974).
115. The list is not intended to be exclusive and no factor need be dispositive.
Rather, a distillation of the factors that have tended most frequently to influence
Board decisions has been set forth. Professor Covington also proposes to amend
Spielberg. Covington, supra note 90, at 133-34. His proposal, however, retains Spielberg's "checklist" type of approach. Id. He also suggests, however, that when the
criteria he proposes have not been fully satisfied, the arbitral award and written
opinion should be used as evidence in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding. Id. at 128-29. In contrast, use of the written opinion as evidence in the unfair
labor practice proceeding is inappropriate under the present proposal. Deferral decisions are reached only after all relevant circumstances have been examined. Thus,
once a decision has been made not to defer, there is simply nothing left to examine.
Professor Davis has endorsed rules that, like the present proposal, allow for a measure of flexibility, stating that "[r]ules will not suffice. Rules must be supplemented
with discretion. When discretion shrinks too much, affirmative action is needed to
recreate it." K. Davis, supra note 76, § 1.07, at 23.
116. The arbitrator must have resolved the issues as the Board would have, based
upon precedent and interpretation of the Act. One may argue that such a policy is
not a deferral policy, but rather a policy under which the Board "adopts" a decision
with which it agrees. See Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 102 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1247, 1250 (Sept. 28, 1979) (Penello, Member, concurring). Additionally, the
proposed standard replaces a "clearly repugnant" standard with a "merely erroneous"
test. See generally Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1151 (1979) (Penello,
Member, dissenting). Purely as a definitional matter, however, the term -'deferral"
remains appropriate. "To defer" means "to submit or yield to another's %ish or opinion." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 216 (1973). This deferral policy
will not undermine the parties' confidence in the finality of arbitration for several
reasons. First, current Board law is in such flux that parties have little idea as to
whether an arbitrator's decision will be final. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text. Second, employees who lose in arbitration are not likely to seek a subsequent adjudication by the Board if the deferral policy is modified so as to make
deferral less likely. Even before Spielberg had been announced, virtually all arbitration awards were followed. See Mathews, supra note 8, at 37. Finally, the Board
should not abdicate its statutory responsibility merely on the basis of a speculative
adverse effect on arbitration.
117. "Rules without discretion cannot fully take into account the need for tailoring
results to unique facts and circumstances of particular cases. The justification for
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circuit courts use the Board's own doctrine as an entering wedge to
reach the merits of the case."' The Board's order must be enforced,
absent a showing that the large discretion retained has been abused,
or that the Board has acted in contravention of the Act."'
The changes submitted for consideration are extensive and would
have a substantial impact. Accordingly, the Board should effect such
changes through the mechanism of its rulemaking powers.2 0 The
Board is generally endowed with discretion to choose between rulemaking and informal adjudication in a given situation.' 2 ' A change in
Board policy as fundamental as that proposed here, however, is precisely the type of modification that should be undertaken only after
the Board has examined all relevant factors pursuant to the statutory
procedure.'
The importance of the issues involved demands no
less.

discretion is often the need for individualized justice." K. Davis, supra note 76,
§ 107, at 22.
118. E.g., NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. An obvious act of defiance would arise if the Board determined that it would
remedy a breach of contract that did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The
Board plainly lacks authority to do so, and, in such a case, reviewing courts would be
required to refuse enforcement of the Board's order. See Kohis v. NLRB, 629 F.2d
173, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
120. The Board, under § 6 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156
(1976), may promulgate rules pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
121. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-94 (1974). This discretion is
acknowledged even by those who maintain that the Board must employ rulemaking
mechanisms to change Spielberg. Petition for Certiorari at 16, Max Factor and Co. v.
NLRB, No. 80-1246. (U.S., filed Jan. 21, 1981). See generally NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); K. Davis, supra note 76, § 1.07, at 18. Nevertheless,
"there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to
an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. at 294.
122. Petition for Certiorari at 16, Max Factor and Co. v. NLRB, No. 80-1246
(U.S., filed Jan. 21, 1981) ("Requiring a rulemaking proceeding here would . .. ensure that a change in policies as fundamental as this one would be based upon fully
articulated reasoning and an accurate perception of practical realities, rather than
upon the constantly changing political complexion of the Board itself,"). Additionally,
such a procedure would afford all interested parties the opportunity to be heard prior
to the effective date of any proposed policy. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976),
agencies are required to publish notice of proposed rules in the Federal Register,
unless "the agency for good cause finds ... that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest." Id. § 553(b)(B). After
notice has been given, "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of wTitten data, views, or arguments." Id. § 553(c). To insure that interested parties will have sufficient time to
react to a proposed rule, a time differential of 30 days is imposed between publication and the effective date of the rule. Id.; see 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise § 6.12 (1958).
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CONCLUSION

The Board's inconsistent application of Spielberg is unwarranted
because of the unfairness to litigants and the departure from fundamental precepts of administrative law created by such inconsistency. Reviewing courts, therefore, should follow the Third Circuit's
lead and insist on adherence to the Spielberg principles. Recognition
of the inherent deficiencies of these principles, however, is long overdue. Since 1955, a doctrine has been in effect that, under the guise
of fostering arbitration, has resulted in the consideration of statutory
rights by a party unqualified to resolve issues affecting those rights.
Accordingly, Spielberg should be amended. The Board must accept
ultimate responsibility for the protection of rights guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act.
John G. Culhane

